On October 15, 2010, the Philippine Supreme Court declared in Administrative Matter No. 10-7-17-SC that Justice del Castillo did not commit plagiarism in his ponencia in Vinuya v. Romula (G. R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010). In the Ethics Committee's decision, the justices mention the argument presented by the petitioners of the case that the question of intent is immaterial in deciding whether or not plagiarism has been committed. They counterargue, however, that "plagiarism is essentially a form of fraud where intent to deceive is inherent."
The justices' description of plagiarism, however, contradicts a widely-accepted understanding of plagiarism in the academe and in the community of researchers. In the conventions of scholarly work, unintentional plagiarism is still labeled "plagiarism." Whether or not the person responsible for the plagiarism intended it, the fact remains that the original source of the ideas or words used in a text was not cited, and the result is that those ideas and words appear to belong to someone else. In some cases, the meaning of the original text is distorted and the reader is not given the chance to verify the plagiarist's reading of that text. Regardless of intent, when a person plagiarizes, a wrong has still been committed against the community of truth-seekers, against the individuals to whom the ideas were not attributed, and to the value of truth as a whole.
To be a researcher, whether in the academe or in any other endeavor of knowledge generation, is precisely to be among a community dedicated to the defense of truth. One of the primary responsibilities, then, of a researcher, scholar, or academic is to safeguard this value by vigilantly, meticulously and honestly paraphrasing source material, crediting one's sources, and representing ideas as original authors intended them.
There is no question that intentional plagiarism is a graver offense than unintentional plagiarism; nonetheless, even without an intention to commit fraud, a person who commits plagiarism might, at the very least, be guilty of irresponsibility or neglect.
The decision fails to acknowledge that an offense is committed as well, even when plagiarism is unintentional. As worded, the decision may be misconstrued to mean that no wrong at all occurs when a researcher fails to deliberately identify the original sources of borrowed words or ideas. In the case involving Justice del Castillo, there must be some acknowledgment, at its simplest, that one did not do what one was supposed to do, and that is something that must be rectified.
It is possible that some in the legal community view the law primarily as prohibitive, where notions of "wrongdoing" and "burden of proof" are limiting principles. We are grateful, however, for Justice Sereno's dissenting opinion that implies that the Supreme Court does not only have a disciplinary authority, but also a moral authority and the ability "to positively educate" the people. Morality is concerned not only with preventing and punishing the commission of wrong, but more importantly with a positive pursuit of the good, and with honing sensibilities of character and virtue.
No one should deny the complexity of the issues involved in the case and thereby the difficulty of making judgments about the rightness and wrongness of the act in question. And indeed complex situations require that finer distinctions be made. But in that case we must also make distinctions about distinctions, for there are distinctions that are legitimate and necessary, and there are others that only serve as an evasion of the issue and thereby of responsibility. The recognition of such complexity and the need to make distinctions should not mean that we should do away with clarity of principles as well as the firmness of our convictions about those principles. What is at stake here is the principle of veracity, and ultimately of truth, which cannot be violated without harming the human community as a whole as it can only be founded on and sustained by that principle. We are therefore unsettled and morally offended by the decision of the Supreme Court whose definition of plagiarism in relation to intention goes against widely accepted norms and standards and, far more seriously, presents a danger to our shared commitment to the principles of veracity and truth. We are hoping that with the presentation of this perspective, the court in its wisdom will better clarify its decision for the community of truth seekers that will be affected by it. The court's decision sends a message to all of us regarding the value of care and integrity in truth seeking. Its demand for accountability too explains to us the value of honorably taking responsibility for whatever mistakes we have committed in order to heal the wounds our acts have inflicted.
Signed,
Individual Faculty Members of the Department of Philosophy, Ateneo de Manila University
Rowena P. Azada-Palacios, MA
Remmon E. Barbaza, PhD
Oscar Bulaong, Jr., PhD
Mark Joseph Calano, PhD
Louis Catalan, SJ, PhD
Manuel B. Dy, Jr., PhD
Jacqueline Jacinto, MA
Michael Ner E. Mariano, PhD Cand
Pamela Joy Mariano, MA Cand
Jesus Deogracias Principe, PhD
Agustin Martin G. Rodriguez, PhD
Andrew K. L. Soh, MA
Roy Allan Tolentino, MA
John Carlo P. Uy, MA Cand
The justices' description of plagiarism, however, contradicts a widely-accepted understanding of plagiarism in the academe and in the community of researchers. In the conventions of scholarly work, unintentional plagiarism is still labeled "plagiarism." Whether or not the person responsible for the plagiarism intended it, the fact remains that the original source of the ideas or words used in a text was not cited, and the result is that those ideas and words appear to belong to someone else. In some cases, the meaning of the original text is distorted and the reader is not given the chance to verify the plagiarist's reading of that text. Regardless of intent, when a person plagiarizes, a wrong has still been committed against the community of truth-seekers, against the individuals to whom the ideas were not attributed, and to the value of truth as a whole.
To be a researcher, whether in the academe or in any other endeavor of knowledge generation, is precisely to be among a community dedicated to the defense of truth. One of the primary responsibilities, then, of a researcher, scholar, or academic is to safeguard this value by vigilantly, meticulously and honestly paraphrasing source material, crediting one's sources, and representing ideas as original authors intended them.
There is no question that intentional plagiarism is a graver offense than unintentional plagiarism; nonetheless, even without an intention to commit fraud, a person who commits plagiarism might, at the very least, be guilty of irresponsibility or neglect.
The decision fails to acknowledge that an offense is committed as well, even when plagiarism is unintentional. As worded, the decision may be misconstrued to mean that no wrong at all occurs when a researcher fails to deliberately identify the original sources of borrowed words or ideas. In the case involving Justice del Castillo, there must be some acknowledgment, at its simplest, that one did not do what one was supposed to do, and that is something that must be rectified.
It is possible that some in the legal community view the law primarily as prohibitive, where notions of "wrongdoing" and "burden of proof" are limiting principles. We are grateful, however, for Justice Sereno's dissenting opinion that implies that the Supreme Court does not only have a disciplinary authority, but also a moral authority and the ability "to positively educate" the people. Morality is concerned not only with preventing and punishing the commission of wrong, but more importantly with a positive pursuit of the good, and with honing sensibilities of character and virtue.
No one should deny the complexity of the issues involved in the case and thereby the difficulty of making judgments about the rightness and wrongness of the act in question. And indeed complex situations require that finer distinctions be made. But in that case we must also make distinctions about distinctions, for there are distinctions that are legitimate and necessary, and there are others that only serve as an evasion of the issue and thereby of responsibility. The recognition of such complexity and the need to make distinctions should not mean that we should do away with clarity of principles as well as the firmness of our convictions about those principles. What is at stake here is the principle of veracity, and ultimately of truth, which cannot be violated without harming the human community as a whole as it can only be founded on and sustained by that principle. We are therefore unsettled and morally offended by the decision of the Supreme Court whose definition of plagiarism in relation to intention goes against widely accepted norms and standards and, far more seriously, presents a danger to our shared commitment to the principles of veracity and truth. We are hoping that with the presentation of this perspective, the court in its wisdom will better clarify its decision for the community of truth seekers that will be affected by it. The court's decision sends a message to all of us regarding the value of care and integrity in truth seeking. Its demand for accountability too explains to us the value of honorably taking responsibility for whatever mistakes we have committed in order to heal the wounds our acts have inflicted.
Signed,
Individual Faculty Members of the Department of Philosophy, Ateneo de Manila University
Rowena P. Azada-Palacios, MA
Remmon E. Barbaza, PhD
Oscar Bulaong, Jr., PhD
Mark Joseph Calano, PhD
Louis Catalan, SJ, PhD
Manuel B. Dy, Jr., PhD
Jacqueline Jacinto, MA
Michael Ner E. Mariano, PhD Cand
Pamela Joy Mariano, MA Cand
Jesus Deogracias Principe, PhD
Agustin Martin G. Rodriguez, PhD
Andrew K. L. Soh, MA
Roy Allan Tolentino, MA
John Carlo P. Uy, MA Cand
Posts
